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Widespread breakdowns of contractual arrangements are the characteristic feature of some 
macroeconomic crises. Economies and political systems generate and must process the consequences of 
large-scale “broken promises” (Leijonhufvud, 2003). This paper discusses such phenomena, in the 
specific context of the fluctuations of the Argentine economy. That experience highlights themes which 
have been prominent in Leijonhufvud’s work, like the problems of intertemporal coordination, the 
potentially deviation-amplifying behavior of credit markets in the event of large disturbances, the 
relevance of the sequential decision-making of agents and the interrelated dynamics of policies, 
institutions and economic performance. 
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Introduction 
The study of macroeconomic disorders has analytical and practical relevance. The work of Axel 
Leijonhufvud has been marked by a concern about the scope and limitations of the self-adjustment 
potential of economic (and social) systems. This concern was reflected in a maintained interest in the 
mechanisms and the effects of macroeconomic disruptions, such as the ¨two types of crises¨ 
(Leijonhufvud, 1998a) that put to the test in different ways the ability of economies to deal with stresses. 
High inflations shorten decision horizons and restrict financial transactions and, in the limit, even the 
realization of everyday trades (Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1995). In credit crashes, economies and 
policies must process the consequences of large-scale “broken promises” (Leijonhufvud, 2003). This 
article focuses mainly on this second kind of disturbance. 
Episodes of recession linked to currency and credit crises have been observed in several 
¨emerging economies¨ in recent years (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). These contractions interrupted 
phases of economic growth which at some moment may have seemed robust and likely to persist. The 
abruptness of some transitions, and the difficulty of finding statistical associations between the emergence 
of crises and the past history of ¨fundamental variables¨ (Calvo, 1998, Kaminsky, 1999) have oriented the 
quest for explanations to ¨sudden deaths¨ associated with multiplicities of rational expectations 
equilibriums (e.g. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996), or to phenomena of herd behavior (Chari and 
Kehoe, 2003).  
Effects of contagion and imitation certainly seem relevant in critical junctures, when agents 
perceive that the system may be approaching a sharp turning point, and are prepared to respond with 
speed and intensity to what others around them are doing. However, agents should already be in a state of 
alert to the possibility of a discontinuity. This does not seem likely to happen without ¨fundamental 
reasons¨ for people to presume that the economic environment may change quickly and substantially. 
Macroeconomic configurations and histories may be interpreted in quite different ways. Often, in 
countries which are running current account deficits of some size, or where the volume of debts is 
increasing rapidly, opinions are divided between those that consider the willingness to borrow and to lend 
as rational responses that correctly take into account future repayment capacities, and those that anticipate 
difficulties in the fulfillment of obligations (Heymann, 1994). The assessments of sustainability, in fact, 
depend on conjectures about future income levels, and thus about the growth potential of the economy. 
By their intricate nature, growth processes are liable to generate heterogeneous and changing beliefs. In 
some economies, the activity of evaluating growth prospects (or making decisions which implicitly 
































































depend on those prospects) on the basis of ongoing, period-by-period information, can well produce 
variable results. The macroeconomic experience of Argentina may offer an illustration of interactions 
between large-amplitude cycles and the actual and anticipated growth performance.  
The aggregate output of the Argentine economy has clearly not cycled around a fixed linear trend 
(Graph 1). The changes in the medium-term outlook and the wide fluctuations took place in a history 
characterized by an eventful evolution of private behaviors and public policies. In various instances the 
performance of the economy differed considerably from what would have resulted from extrapolating 
past observations. In the eighties, price instability was a prominent feature, and real activity oscillated 
around a stagnant trend. At the end of the decade, hyperinflationary bursts created strong disturbances. 
Some time later, major policy reforms were implemented, and monetary policy was tightly constrained by 
the system of convertibility which established a hard peg to the dollar. In the early nineties, demand and 
output increased sharply and prices eventually stabilized, although the residual drift implied a real 
appreciation in the meantime. The expansion was interrupted at by an abrupt credit shock at the end of 
1994, after the Mexican devaluation. The impact of the shock was strong but transitory. A new round of 
rapid growth probably induced expectations of further rises in incomes. These were dramatically 
disappointed in a long recession, which accelerated in 2001 in the final collapse of the convertibility 
regime. The end of that system was associated with a widespread breakdown of contracts, political 
disruptions, and a general sentiment of deep frustration. However, expectations of a total crash and 
irreversible stagnation were themselves invalidated, as the economy showed a rapid recovery. In all these 
oscillations, identifying economic trends was a non-trivial practical problem. 
Trying to make sense of a history of this sort probably requires paying attention to the 
mechanisms of a general sort that may have shaped behavior, and also to the real-time evolution of beliefs 
and decisions. The next section discusses some analytical points that seem relevant to large credit crises, 
especially the role of wealth perceptions, the denomination of financial contracts, and potential effects 
that may dampen or amplify disturbances. This discussion highlights themes which appear in the context 
of Argentine fluctuations, an account of which is presented in Section 3. 
GRAPH 1 
GDP AT CONSTANT PRICES 



















Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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II. Information, coordination and macroeconomic 
crises 
1.  Small fluctuations and large crashes 
Most normal business cycles are relatively mild ups and downs around more or less well defined trends. 
For the average individual, consumption may somewhat fall in a recession, but lifetime living standards 
are not much changed by the event. Although some segments of the population are more exposed to 
macroeconomic movements than others, a single episode of average magnitude will not alter income 
distribution considerably, or for long. If certain agents are interconnected through a network of 
transactions, those links could be expected to remain in existence after a small recession. It is as if the 
economic system was “bent”, but not “broken”, and kept its main organizational features even as 
aggregate real variables oscillate. 
Macroeconomic crashes seem to be phenomena of another type, in their quantitative intensity and 
in the nature of the processes at work. The magnitudes of the falls in real activity and consumption 
correspond to major changes in the working and living patterns of large parts of a population (for 
instance, during the 1998-2002 recession in Argentina, aggregate private consumption declined by more 
than 20%; some groups experienced stronger adjustments). Events like these have non-trivial welfare 
consequences. They can have sizable and durable implications for the economic prospects of individuals, 
and are likely to modify substantially the anticipated future paths of income and spending.  
A precise definition of what constitutes a promise, or the breakdown of a promise, would involve 
in itself non-trivial problems when it is known that, through variables like “risk-premia”, the parties have 
recognized that explicit commitments are not literally unconditional, but at the same time the set of 
contingencies that would lead to default remains undetermined. However, even without such a sharp 
definition, it is an observed characteristic feature of some macroeconomic crises that large numbers of 
contractual agreements throughout the economy are not fulfilled. In one way or another, those agreements 
are subject to re-negotiation., and the absence of objectively stated contingency clauses complicates the 
process. While the re-arrangements of rights and obligations go on, production and exchange are hindered 
by tight credit constraints and by uncertainties or legal restraints on the command and the use of 
resources. Many firms are closed or reorganized. Trading relationships get broken or disturbed, which 
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complicates the coordination of market exchanges (Howitt, 2006). The economic disorder associated with 
a crisis may operate like a strong shock on measured aggregate productivity.  
Even among major crashes there may be different degrees of intensity, according to the extension 
of the set of defaulting agents. In an episode of the historical significance of the great depression itself, 
the solvency of public sectors was not put into question everywhere, and thus governments retained some 
leeway to use the credit available to them in order to alleviate constraints on private spending 
(Leijonhufvud, 1973). In other cases (like the recent crisis in Argentina), the state of default may reach 
the government, as well as important segments of the private sector, banks in particular. Then, it is 
practically the whole set of economic obligations which has to be re-defined. The system goes through an 
overall recalculation of asset values, as old estimates (or, at least, old “face values”) have been made 
irrelevant by the crisis. But those recalculations themselves  and, in general, the potential estimates of 
future incomes of agents across the economy, are highly uncertain, since in the midst of a crisis it may be 
quite difficult to anticipate outcomes among the wide range of open possibilities. 
In the limit, it is conceivable that a very large shock causes bankruptcies throughout the private 
sector and default on the public debt, and that desperate monetary expansions or mistrust on the part of 
the public induce a flight from the national currency. Such a combination of depression and hyperinflation 
can thoroughly disorganize the economy. It is hard to say how close Argentina came to this outcome in its 
recent crisis. In any case it was prevented, probably through a coincidence of some useful inertia in the 
behavior of agents, who acted “in normal mode” in aspects of their everyday economic activity, and a 
policy response driven by the fearful image of a perfect storm.   
2.  Leveraged growth, defaults and renegotiations 
Revisions of beliefs about the growth prospects of an economy (or, more generally, about the income 
prospects of a debtor) seem capable of generating phenomena typically associated with large credit 
fluctuations.1 In contracts subject to default risk (which, naturally, emerge when the debtor has, on 
average, prospects of a large output growth, but the magnitude of potential growth can vary on a wide 
range), the contractually determined interest rate increases with the size of the debt. There can be a ceiling 
on the supply of credit, given by the volume of debt that would induce the debtor to default in the future 
even in “good” states of the world. Now, if a shock lowers the debt ceiling, a sudden adjustment of 
spending by the debtor may be called for. This effect can induce corridor-type effects. If the debtor 
economy suffers a small negative income shock with both permanent and transitory components, 
unrestricted access to credit allows it to smooth the current impact on consumption. By contrast, a large 
shock that triggers credit rationing forces a large adjustment in the present period, so that the effect of the 
shock is initially amplified.  
In the event of a contraction in the supply of credit, the debtor can “accept” it, or else choose to 
default. The incentive to default is limited by the costs associated with the breakdown of contracts; 
however, if the credit “stop” would induce a too sharp fall in consumption, the shock may cause a 
suspension of contractual payments. In this sense, credit contractions would be motivated by potential 
default but, at the same time, they actually occur when their anticipated impact is not so severe as to 
induce an actual default. Also, when default takes place, there may be circumstances where a 
“restructuring” occurs at once; however, it is possible that the parties have incentives to delay an 
agreement (Ghosal and Miller, 2005). This possibility could arise in principle because of an effect of 
flexibility preference, if future information about the repayment capacity is sufficiently valuable: when 
the expectations about the “permanent” value of output are very diffuse at the time of default, and they 
                                                     
1  The following remarks owe much to conversations with L. Gorno. See also Heymann et al. (2001), Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2004b), Arellano and Mendoza (2002), Mendoza (2006). 
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may become more precise later on, a strategy of waiting before entering into new contracts may generate 
large savings in expected default costs. 
Certainly, those effects would depend on the values of parameters which are not easy to 
determine precisely, like the distribution of future output, and the size of the “penalties” in the case of 
default. The evolution of views and perceptions about such parameters as new information arrives and 
gets to be processed, and the decisions taken in consequence, may produce quite eventful histories. The 
experience of Argentina appears to point in that direction. 
3. Wealth perceptions 
Large macroeconomic oscillations vary individual and aggregate wealth perceptions and, reciprocally, 
they can be seen as consequences of revisions of previous valuations. A perfectly anticipated crisis is 
almost a contradiction in terms. Widespread defaults on debts and dramatic drops in real consumption are 
naturally interpreted as indications that agents made sizeable mistakes in their forecasts of their own 
incomes and those of their debtors. Such events disappoint expectations under which agents planned their 
consumption and asset holdings or, at least, they reveal a “bad draw” of the lottery that determines the 
value of income flows over relatively long periods of time. As a matter of observation, both “calculated 
risk-taking” and actual disappointments seem at work in crises. Indicators like interest rate spreads show 
awareness of the possibility of defaults. However, market behavior sometimes also suggests large 
differences of beliefs between agents, with some of them taking precautionary measures (for example, by 
building up liquidity in “safe” assets) before the crisis became imminent, while many others appear to 
have been surprised by the event. The recent episode in Argentina provides indications of that type of 
heterogeneity. 
Everywhere, some agents make mistakes or have bad luck; the outcomes are somehow processed. 
In any case, individuals make choices in an environment subject to irreversible and hardly predictable 
changes (technological innovations are sufficient for that). “Normal” economies show much volatility at 
the micro level (Fanelli, 2006). Aggregate wealth is not easy to estimate even there (Haussmann and 
Sturzenegger, 2005). However, overall, those economies have reasonably well established trends. 
Episodes of “irrational exuberance” may happen in perhaps sizable segments of the economy. Problems 
of fiscal sustainability may emerge on the horizon. But, typically, the historical experience allows for a 
certain confidence in extrapolating stylized features of economic growth. In most likely scenarios, broad 
categories of agents, including the public sector, will face opportunities roughly in line with expectations, 
and service their debts. Everyday problems in coordinating intertemporal decisions (Leijonhufvud, 1981, 
1998a) surface in adjustments in the level of consumption of individual households, in low returns for 
particular firms, or in bankruptcies which are handled routinely by the legal system. Despite the existence, 
in principle, of much “deep uncertainty” those results may be seen, on the whole, as unlucky outcomes in 
reasonable gambles. 
In entrenched very high inflations, transactions are disturbed, but there are few formal promises 
to be broken:  agents recognize the macroeconomic uncertainty and, therefore, they are reluctant to enter 
into contracts. Planning and decision horizons are very short; economic behavior is marked by strong 
flexibility preference. By contrast, debt crises require agents to be confident enough to borrow and lend, 
or to consume beyond their “permanent” capacity. They must have foreseen a sufficiently good, and 
probable enough, state of the world so as to overcome the disincentives of high perceived risks (or they 
have considered that such risks were not that large). These are features of economies which at a certain 
moment can appear likely to move up on the international income scales. Somehow, the economy in 
question should be perceived as ready for that progress. Crises may mark the uncertainty of the “catch-
up” process. 
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4. Uses of the past 
Crises are relatively rare events in a single economy, and they seem to have distinctive features 
(Kaminsky, 2003) that may limit the information to be obtained by pooling observations from various 
episodes. The tension between the potential usefulness of analogies with events in other economies and 
the arguments for “differentiation” between cases is observed in practice in the opinions and attitudes of 
analysts and agents. In some cases, the own past of an economy may appear as problematic for the 
purpose of forming expectations. 
Recommendations of “structural reforms” have been abundant in policy discussions of recent 
decades. Whether because of such reforms or for other reasons, some economies appear at times to be 
undergoing rapid structural change in terms of their configuration and behavior. The “emerging” or 
“transition”  tags refer to economies which are presumed to be in the process of modifying their 
performance in permanent ways; the evidence suggest that these economies experience relatively more 
intense “shocks to growth trends” (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004b). If a new growth trend is, or may be, in 
the course of being established, agents must then learn about the future opportunities and constraints that 
they will face. The problem of intertemporal coordination is posed in very concrete terms: whether the 
actions of other agents in the future will correspond to the anticipations that are implicit in the current 
decisions of an individual. 
Quite different types of behavior may, or may not, be sustainable, depending on future 
realizations. A configuration with lower savings rates, real appreciations and investments concentrated in 
the production of non-tradable goods may, with reasonable motives, generate concerns about the 
sustainability of dollar debts, but it may turn out to be part of a well coordinated path if something 
happens so as to generate enough growth in the supply of tradable goods. In a growth transition, forward-
looking behaviors are likely to be based on the anticipation of future changes. A shock to expectations 
may be immediately identifiable by an outside observer, but it may also consist of “something that does 
not happen” like, in the case just mentioned, a less-than-anticipated increase in productivity.  
During growth transitions agents are engaged in predicting the outcome of ongoing development 
processes. Those processes can have general features and patterns, but they also appear to contain 
historical, non-repetitive elements. “Objective” probability distributions of future trends are hard to 
establish. Decisions are somehow based on conjectures, about expected outcomes, and also about the 
confidence that should be assigned to those expectations. Both type I and type II errors are possible. On 
occasions, individuals would bear especially in mind the existence of strong uncertainties, or a history of 
false starts, suggesting caution and skepticism; in others, they may react strongly in an upswing to the 
prospects of future improvements. A naïve form of the rational expectations assumptions (“market 
variables are generally the result of correct aggregate expectations”) would tend to lend the appearance of 
sustainability to current patterns of behavior (as if most collective prophecies were to be fulfilled). In any 
case, economies subject to crises may have features that could provide rationalization for widely different 
levels of average income. In the lapse of a few years, for example, the Argentine economy seemed to 
“provide reason” for beliefs that the permanent level of incomes in terms of dollars was not much higher 
than the 3000 dollars per capita observed in hyperinflation, later for opinions that stabilization and 
reforms could sustain spending levels of around 9000 dollars per capita or, more recently, for views that 
the crisis had produced an irreversible fall in incomes back to the 3000 dollar mark.5. The denomination 
of financial contracts 
The levels of incomes measured in foreign currencies are particularly relevant variables when 
financial contracts are “dollarized”. The diffusion across countries of the practice of denominating 
obligations in an international currency, and the potential for debt deflation effects in such countries in the 
event of a real devaluation have received much attention in recent literature (Jeanne, 2003, Ize and Levy 
Yeyati 2003, Cespedes et al., 2000, Chang and Velasco 2001). Contractual dollarization probably reveals 
the persistence of doubts about macroeconomic, and particularly, monetary policies. In an economy that 
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has stabilized after a high inflation, the practice of writing dollar contracts may respond to residual fears 
of a collapse of stabilization in which domestic prices rise abruptly, which offset the perceived risks of 
shocks on the real exchange rate (Heymann and Kawamura, 2005). It thus suggests that the remaining 
“nominal” uncertainty over more or less long periods is stronger than the “real” uncertainty over future 
relative prices.  An economy which experiences a large expansion of dollarized credits would then 
correspond with a special configuration of beliefs, with optimism about its real opportunities (so that, in 
particular, a strong internal demand in the future may sustain high levels of domestic prices and incomes 
in dollar terms) while, at the same time, agents are suspicious of the possibility of policy surprises that 
may change the real value of nominal (or indexed) contracts. At the same time, financial dollarization 
causes “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000), and increases the exit costs of fixed-exchange 
regime. In the Argentine case, this lock-in effect was particularly important, perhaps much more so than 
the legal status of the convertibility regime in effect between 1991 and 2001.  
 Dollarized contracts make the fulfillment of obligations contingent on the stability of real 
incomes and the real exchange rate. Various types of shocks or expectation changes can shift, and 
considerably, the sustainable real exchange rate, and the perceptions about its value. Irrespective of 
whether it happens through deflation or nominal deprecation, a large enough relative price movement can 
then result in insolvencies.  
5. The denomination of financial contracts 
The levels of incomes measured in foreign currencies are particularly relevant variables when financial 
contracts are “dollarized”. The diffusion across countries of the practice of denominating obligations in an 
international currency, and the potential for debt deflation effects in such countries in the event of a real 
devaluation have received much attention in recent literature (Jeanne, 2003, Ize and Levy Yeyati 2003, 
Cespedes et al., 2000, Chang and Velasco 2001). Contractual dollarization probably reveals the 
persistence of doubts about macroeconomic, and particularly, monetary policies. In an economy that has 
stabilized after a high inflation, the practice of writing dollar contracts may respond to residual fears of a 
collapse of stabilization in which domestic prices rise abruptly, which offset the perceived risks of shocks 
on the real exchange rate (Heymann and Kawamura, 2005). It thus suggests that the remaining “nominal” 
uncertainty over more or less long periods is stronger than the “real” uncertainty over future relative 
prices.  An economy which experiences a large expansion of dollarized credits would then correspond 
with a special configuration of beliefs, with optimism about its real opportunities (so that, in particular, a 
strong internal demand in the future may sustain high levels of domestic prices and incomes in dollar 
terms) while, at the same time, agents are suspicious of the possibility of policy surprises that may change 
the real value of nominal (or indexed) contracts. At the same time, financial dollarization causes “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000), and increases the exit costs of fixed-exchange regime. In the 
Argentine case, this lock-in effect was particularly important, perhaps much more so than the legal status 
of the convertibility regime in effect between 1991 and 2001.  
 Dollarized contracts make the fulfillment of obligations contingent on the stability of real 
incomes and the real exchange rate. Various types of shocks or expectation changes can shift, and 
considerably, the sustainable real exchange rate, and the perceptions about its value. Irrespective of 
whether it happens through deflation or nominal deprecation, a large enough relative price movement can 
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6. Stabilizers and multipliers  
Financial dollarization can be a source of vulnerability, but not every shock will generate a crisis. Even if 
the nominal exchange rate does not vary much, the real rate can have some mobility through movements 
in domestic prices. If, on average, the shock calls for a relatively small reduction of incomes in terms of 
the unit of account, the size and diffusion of defaults on debts can also remain limited. A moderate 
adjustment in aggregate real spending may then restore budget constraints to positions perceived as 
sustainable, without generating significant secondary effects. Large shocks, by contrast, can induce 
additional rounds of impulses. The crisis that ended the convertibility system in Argentina provides 
indications of such feedback reactions, where doubts about the solvency of debtors and fears about the 
future state of the economy led to capital flight and credit contraction, and depressed internal spending, 
which interrupted trading relationships, in turn reinforcing the spiral. In a state of panic, it would appear 
that prices of goods and assets must fall considerably to induce “stabilizing speculation”.   
The Argentine crisis shows the deep disruptions provoked by the expectation and the realization 
of a contractual breakdown. At the same time, the recovery after the crash points to the existence of 
endogenous mechanisms that may have helped to reverse the decline of real activity. In this instance, the 
initial impulse was not a fiscal expansion, which a bankrupt government could hardly attempt (although 
emergency transfers to low-income households may have helped to maintain demand). A significant 
effect may have resulted from a reaction of spending (and a moderation of capital flight) by agents who 
had profited from the massive impact of a large devaluation on the real value of dollar assets (many of 
which were held in liquid form) and incomes generated in tradable sectors. In a situation of depressed 
aggregate incomes and tight liquidity constraints, these beneficiaries of a massive redistribution of 
purchasing power were those who had the availability of resources to initiate a demand injection.  
7. Policies and institutions 
Economic policies are the result of the objectives and perceptions of policy-makers. The incentive effects 
create special principal-agent problems, and they can certainly affect economic performance. However, 
pure incentive misalignments do not seem capable of generating crises (in the sense of widespread 
contractual breakdowns) without the intervention of some type of error in expectations. From the point of 
view of intertemporal choices, policy decisions, as well as the actions of private agents, are predicated 
upon conjectures about future conditions. The estimation of permanent or normal levels of incomes is an 
issue for the government, and its prospective creditors, as well as for private parties. Apart from 
politically induced myopia, policies that appear ex-post pro-cyclical may also be the result of confusion 
about macroeconomic trends.   
Tightly defined rules may be used to deal with incentive biases in the negotiation, design and 
implementation of economic policies. Macroeconomic shocks or inconsistencies typically call for policy 
flexibility. Countries where the political process has shown a tendency to produce socially undesirable 
outcomes (such as a history of high inflation) and which are also potentially subject to large real 
disturbances will have difficulties in establishing durable and well functioning macroeconomic 
institutions. Unbounded discretion may lead to a short-sighted maximization of narrow interests, or to 
volatile policies decided under the pressures of the groups that happen to have the stronger influence at a 
particular moment. Policy regimes based on rigid rules make seemingly unconditional promises of 
permanence irrespective of contingencies, and may end up breaking down when those commitments 
become untenable. The Argentine experience of the last decades offers examples of both types.  
A monetary rule can only provide a very imperfect substitute for other policies and institutions. 
The Argentine convertibility regime had important effects in stopping an endemic inflation; over time it 
became a central reference for a public who viewed political and economic institutions with mistrust. 
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Eventually, the monetary system was seen as supplying not only a (rigid) nominal anchor, but perhaps 
also an implicit promise of stability of aggregate income. The fixed exchange rate did serve as an 
“external scaffold” to organize economic behavior (Clark, 1998, AL, 2006), but it may have done so in 
ways that the real performance of the economy could not support. In fact, the system seemed designed to 
maximize credibility in order to take advantage of opportunities in a potential “good state”, characterized 
by high sustainable income levels and a historically appreciated real exchange rate. Almost by 
construction, neither monetary policies nor the financial sector nor the political system were prepared to 
handle a situation where a substantial real depreciation was required. 
The choice of institutions and policies depends on the political game (interests, power), and also 
on how the public and policy-makers process past experiences (Sargent, 2001). The choice of the 
convertibility regime in Argentina in the early nineties was influenced by the particular inflationary 
history of the country. Traces of the past experience of the economy can also be found in features of the 
economic and policy behavior after the breakdown of convertibility.  
Crises typically motivate intensive learning (or, at least, changes of beliefs and opinions) on the 
part of private and public agents. At the same time, they manifest or induce problems in policy-making. 
Ultimately, high inflations reflect a failure of societies and political system to agree on systematic ways to 
deal with the pressures on the government budget. Credit crises in open economies may involve 
overspending by the public sector that does not elicit a “Ricardian” response of spending restraint in the 
public. In any case, crises like that of Argentina throw to an already disturbed political arena the question 
of whether, and how, to intervened to revise broken contracts when “the rules on the ways to deal with the 
violation of rules have been violated” (Leijonhufvud, 2003, Vaz, 1998). And, even in a post-crisis 
recovery, rebuilding institutions after a big shock is certainly a non-trivial matter.   
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III. Crisis and recovery in Argentina2 
1. After hyperinflation: large- scale reforms, tight constraints on 
monetary policies   
By the end of the 1980’s, Argentina had an eventful history of high inflation. But even for a population 
that had developed (at substantial costs in terms of economic performance) sundry modes of adapting to 
monetary instability, the hyperinflationary episodes of 1989 and 1990 represented a truly traumatic 
experience, where even routine transactions were disturbed. That experience reinforced the public 
demand for price stabilization, and the view that the inflationary behavior of macroeconomic policies 
could not be avoided without tight constraints on the central bank. In addition, the lack of trust in the 
national currency had induced a widespread use of the dollar as a store of value and a denominator of 
financial contracts, and even of some prices. Even though the real exchange rate had shown wide 
oscillations, the price of the dollar had become a highly visible, central reference for everyday decisions. 
In those conditions, the public was prepared to react favorably to the choice by the government to 
establish a monetary system close to a currency board, with a tight peg to the dollar. The automatic (and 
“irreversible”) nature of the system was presented as one of its main assets. The prominent problem was 
to restrict discretion and to stabilize price expectations; maintaining flexibility to manage shocks or 
inconsistencies was not perceived as a salient concern. 
                                                     
2  The performance of the Argentina economy since the early nineties, and especially the crisis of the convertibility 
system has been analyzed, among others, in Perry and Servén (2002), Haussmann and Velasco (2002), Powell 
(2002) , Damill and Frenkel (2003), De la Torre et al. (2002), Galiani et al. (2003), Heymann (2006), Mussa 
(2002). The title of this last work: “Argentina and the IMF: from Triumph to Tragedy” gives a hint about how 
strong were changes in perceptions associated with the crisis.  
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Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
 
The experience of economic stagnation with high volatility left a deep dissatisfaction with the 
economic institutions under which that performance was generated. Moreover, the attitudes of the time, 
throughout Latin America region and elsewhere, tended to be favorable to large-scale economic reforms. 
In fact, the Argentine government implemented comprehensive policy changes in a short period (cf. 
Heymann and Kosacoff,, 2000, Stallings and Peres, 2000), with the introduction of new tax legislation 
and procedures, the  privatization of most public enterprises and a deep trade liberalization, together with 
the constitution of a trade zone with regional neighbors, Brazil in particular. Those measures were meant, 
and understood, as actions designed to induce discrete changes in economic incentives and behaviors, and 
to produce a break in the growth trend.  
2.  Redefining expectations 
The change in the economic environment was apt to cause large revisions of beliefs and expectations. At 
the same time, the international financial markets were predisposed to increase lending to “emerging 
economies”. Such conditions opened the possibility for large movements in spending and credit flows. 
The start of the convertibility monetary regime in April 1991 provoked visible effects on 
behavior. Although prices continued to drift upwards, they did so at a much slower (and decelerating) 
rate, and the drastic fall of interest rates indicated a strong immediate impact on expectations. The drastic 
fall in the heavy inflation tax and the reduced short-term macroeconomic uncertainty made agents more 
willing to spend. Lower risk perceptions tended to reverse the incentives for capital flight and favored a 
revival of the internal supply of credit. After a period of bleak economic prospects, and tight liquidity 
constraints for large groups of households, the response of aggregate consumption was quite rapid, and 
led a strong expansion of domestic spending and real activity.  
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 Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
Both for agents and for analysts, discriminating trends from transitory effects was a non-trivial task. 
“Incredible reforms” or transitory disinflations can in principle stimulate consumption through 
intertemporal substitution effects. Certainly, the permanence of the convertibility regime (which lasted ten 
years, until its eventual collapse) was not firmly established, and doubts remained about the effects of the 
reforms. This lack of full confidence was reflected in indicators such as the absence of a large market for 
assets in domestic currency with anything but short maturities. Indeed, the performance of the economy 
was apt to induce different interpretations. However, many decisions taken during the period seemed to 
reflect the expectation of sustained increases in incomes, in real and in dollar terms, inducing stronger 
propensities to consume, to invest in production for local use, and to supply and demand credit in order to 
finance those activities. A fluid repayment of the newly contracted debts was contingent on the realization 
of high enough future incomes in dollar terms, and consequently, on sufficient growth in the supply (or in 
the world prices) of tradable goods.  
3. Changes in behavior, re-evaluations of permanent incomes 
This expansionary phase, which lasted until 1994, was long for the historical standards of the country 
(since 1975 the economy had not experienced continued growth for four consecutive years) and also 
intense (Graph 1). It showed, as a characteristic feature, a decline in the savings rate (and particularly in 
private savings), along with a sharp recovery in investment (Graph 4), much of which went to activities 
that mainly served the domestic market.  
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GRAPH 4 
NATIONAL SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT AT CURRENT PRICES 
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 Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
The surge in domestic demand was associated with a considerable real appreciation (Graph 5). 
Although the inflation rate eventually converged to very low values, in the meantime, the level of 
domestic prices, especially those of non-traded goods, increased substantially with a fixed exchange rate. 
The same happened with wages. Employment increases were sizable in service sectors, although labor-
saving decisions, especially in manufacturing and now privatized utilities, tended to reduce the demand 
for some segments of workers, mainly in unskilled categories (Damill et al.,2003). Manufacturing firms 
faced stronger import competition, while they had access to cheaper and more varied inputs and capital 
goods. The response was quite heterogeneous, with visible increases in productivity in some enterprises, 
and great difficulties for others, resulting in a high mortality of firms (Kosacoff and Ramos, 1999). In the 
export-oriented agriculture, the use of improved methods of cultivation of grains became increasingly 
widespread. However, the aggregate size of exports did not show any tendency to grow significantly until 
1994. 
GRAPH 5 


































































































































































Nominal exchange rate *US CPI / Argentine CPI
 
Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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4.  Buildup of dollar liabilities 
With rising GDP and a lower real exchange rate declined, the purchasing power of domestic output in 
terms of foreign currencies was greatly revalued (Graph 6). The evolution of that variable was particularly 
relevant since most of newly contracted credits were denominated in dollars.  
GRAPH 6 
GDP PER CAPITA 



















































































   Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
The government did not treat the generalized use of the dollar as a financial denominator as 
problematic or risky: the expansion of credit and the rising capital inflows were interpreted as indicators 
of confidence, and as precursors of strong real growth. Fiscal accounts showed a noticeable adjustment 
(Graph 7), due to much higher tax revenues, and the government received the proceeds from 
privatizations. The public sector restructured its debt within the Brady plan, which reduced the interest 
burden. However, the value of liabilities of the public sector increased, mainly because of the recognition 
of previously undocumented obligations.  
5.  Conflicting signals 
By 1994 the economy was still growing rapidly. The investment rate (around 20% of GDP) had increased 
sharply, although it did not reach levels similar to those of countries engaged in fast development 
processes. The current account deficit indicated at the same time a relatively low volume of savings, and a 
willingness to lend on the part of the rest of the world. Signs of higher productivities existed in various 
types of activities, but that did not provide clear indications of the strength and direction of a solid growth 
trend throughout tradable sectors. Exports had not increased noticeably, although international conditions 
(commodity prices, demand in Brazil) had started to improve (Graph 9).  
The rise in US interest rates in that year was transmitted strongly to other markets, Argentina in 
particular, and was followed by a deceleration of internal demand. The government implemented a 
pension reform, which transferred a good part of the revenues from social security taxes to private funds. 
The primary surplus declined (Graph 7); the possible future effect of the pension reform in reducing 
contingent liabilities of the public sector was not clearly (or rather, clearly not) incorporated in 
evaluations of the fiscal position. These developments probably amplified the shock produced by the 
Mexican devaluation at the end of the year. 
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GRAPH 7 
PRIMARY AND TOTAL BUDGET BALANCES. PUBLIC SECTOR 
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   Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
6.  Credit shock 
The analogy with the case of Mexico had been used in the past as an indication that the policy reforms 
could be expected to produce strong growth effects. Now, the comparison could well operate in the 
opposite direction, suggesting that the economy, and the policy regime, had fragilities which had gone 
undetected or underemphasized. Possibly, the Mexican shock led agents to shift their attitudes about 
where to put the burden of proof of debt sustainability, and to ask for definite reasons to hold assets. In 
such conditions, the government did not have much of an impact in its initial efforts to argue that any 
extrapolation from the Mexican case was invalid. In a situation that raised uncertainties about previously 
held views, people had more incentives to watch the attitudes and behaviors of others closely, both in 
order to gather indications of whether and where “there was something fundamentally wrong”  in the 
economy, and to check for potential runs 
GRAPH 8 
BANK LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
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Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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The drop in the demand for deposits accelerated after a relatively slow and selective start (Graph 
8) The pressure fell on the central bank, which extended rediscounts up to the allowed limits. In any case, 
while reserves declined, bank credit contracted sharply. Aggregate demand and output fell considerably. 
Unemployment jumped by around six percentage points (to more than 18%) in the first half of 1995. 
7.  Surviving the crunch  
However, the sharp recession did not create a public demand for a change in the policy orientation. 
Rather, the strongest fear of a good share of the public seemed to be that of a depreciation that would 
increase the real value of dollar debts and perhaps trigger a new round of high inflation. A package of 
international loans backed the government’s insistence that it did not contemplate the possibility of 
devaluation, and the definite results of the vote that re-elected the President supported that position. Funds 
started to flow back to the banks, and real activity recovered in the last part of the year. 
The episode was widely seen as a strong and successful test of the resilience of the convertibility 
system. In the government’s interpretation, the shock did not reveal weaknesses in the macroeconomic 
framework, but rather the subsistence of mistaken doubts about its commitment to the monetary system, 
which its behavior had largely dispelled. The main area of work for preventive policies was accordingly 
identified to be the reinforcement of prudential supervision and regulation of the financial industry, fully 
maintaining the dual (mainly dollar) standard of denomination.  
8. Long-lasting growth? 
The expansionary phase that ran until 1998 differed from that of the early nineties in the strong 
performance of exports (which doubled in values in the space of five years), propelled by improvements 
in external markets and, on the supply side, by productivity increases, in agriculture particularly (Graphs 
9, 12). Investment reached peaks of about 22% of GDP, while savings rose above the levels of the initial 
years of convertibility.  
GRAPH 9 
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Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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The current account deficit remained considerable, however, in connection with a high demand 
for imports and increasing interests on debts with non-residents. A rising proportion of external financing 
took the form of FDI (Graph 14). The broad and growing presence of international companies (in sectors 
like banks, manufacturing and utilities) suggested that concerns about macroeconomic sustainability were 
not prominent in their decisions at the time. 
9.  Sustainability issues 
In 1998, seven years after the fixing of the exchange rate, real GDP had accumulated a growth of around 
50 % (5.5 % annual average) since the start of the decade. The aggregate increase in incomes had been 
substantial (although with a more uneven distribution), even after considering that part of that growth 
represented a recovery from the hyperinflationary recessions. Warnings about the lack of sustainability of 
the real exchange rate had not materialized so far. The dollar value of GDP had maintained relatively 
steady levels that were reaching about US$ 9000 per capita. Current conditions could support the 
perception that rising activity levels had become the rule, rather than the exception, and that the attained 
values of dollar incomes served as a good reference to estimate permanent levels of spending and 
repayment capacity. The ongoing increase in exports could be seen as indication that, with higher 
productivities, the current configuration of relative prices did not discourage participation in foreign 
markets. 
However, the current account deficit had widened, while the government was generating only 
small primary surpluses. The public and foreign debts, and the corresponding interest flows had been 
rising, in a period of rapid increases in real activity and the value of exports (Graphs 10, 11). 
Sustainability critically depended on a continuation of strong export growth. Otherwise, the alternative to 
a persistent use of large amounts of  external credit (the availability of which a country like Argentina 
could hardly take for granted without visible signs of export potential) was a perhaps sharp deceleration 
of domestic demand. But slowdowns in government revenues would raise financing requirements while 
eroding perceptions about fiscal solvency. Such effects were visible in the period that led to the crisis of 
the convertibility system.  
GRAPH 10 
EXTERNAL INTERESTS, PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS, NET 
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  Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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GRAPH 11 
PUBLIC SECTOR INTEREST PAYMENTS 
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Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
10. Trade, financial shocks; recession 
By 1998, international prices of exportable commodities were declining. The Brazilian devaluation at the 
start of the following year made Argentine goods less competitive in the market of the main trading 
partner. Interest rates had increased sharply after the outbreak of the Russian crisis. Exports and real 
activity fell in absolute terms in 1999 (Graph 12). The budget deficit was pushed upwards by weaker 
revenues and pre-electoral spending, both in the national and provincial jurisdictions; the government 
obtained exceptional financing through the sale of its remaining shares in the oil company. Lower 
investment and higher levels of “country risk” built into interest rate differentials indicated the existence 
of doubts about the future, while the accumulation of foreign assets showed that segments of the private 
sector were starting to seek shelter against the possibility of troubles in the domestic economy (Graph 14). 
However, these relatively mild cautionary behaviors were still far from reflecting a panic, or a general 
sense of rapid collapse. Indicators of “country risk”, did not suggest that Argentina was singled out at the 
time as prominently in danger of crisis compared with other “emerging markets” (Graph 13). The 
prominent attention given to the possibility of full dollarization suggested that, for influential groups of 
analysts and financial operators, the main open question was not the capability of sustaining aggregate 
income at the current levels, but the existence of a potential “exit clause” from the fixed exchange rate. As 
for the general population, the 1999 Presidential election (won by a coalition of opposition parties) 
indicated that it was concerned about social issues but did not expect, or demand, major economic 
changes, particularly regarding the monetary system.  
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GRAPH 12 
EXPORTS OF GOODS 




















































































Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
 
GRAPH 13 
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 Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
11.  Hoping for recovery 
At the same time, economic agents were alert to signals of economic strength or weakness. Attitudes and 
behaviors seemed to reflect the tension between the prospects of two polar scenarios. In one, real activity 
and exports recovered, and allowed simultaneous adjustments in the current account and fiscal deficits, 
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and their financing at moderate costs. At the other extreme was a process of spiraling difficulties, with the 
likelihood that a debt deflation might trigger a financial crisis. The recovery required favorable 
developments in international conditions as well as in domestic performance. The new government 
managed to reduce its deficit through tax increases and spending cuts (including reductions in public 
sector salaries). However, financing requirements remained high, and those measures of adjustment were 
widely interpreted by the public as a recessionary indication. With stagnant aggregate output in 2000 and 
exports which (through a partial rebound in international prices) barely recovered their values of two 
years before, the lack of definite good news gradually increased the level of doubts in the public, and the 
sensitivity to short-term signs, like the daily movements of the prices of government bonds. Nevertheless, 
the demand for deposits did not yet show fears for the solidity of banks.   
 
GRAPH 14 
CURRENT ACCOUNT AND CAPITAL FLOWS 
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   Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
12.  Disappointment: categorical shift?  
At the end of 2000, the government negotiated a package of loans from the IMF. The announcement 
effect on the interest rates on government debt did not last long, given the evidence of no reaction in 
activity levels and lower than anticipated tax revenues. In a state of great political tension, the post of 
economy minister changed hands twice in a few days. Although the re-appointment (by a government of 
different party) of the minister who had introduced the convertibility system tried to remove concerns 
about the possibility of devaluation, attitudes and behavior showed a sharp worsening of expectations. It 
seemed as if many agents had shifted from a waiting mood to the presumption that a crisis was in the 
making, and switched to that scenario as a basis for their decisions (in a manner reminiscent of the 
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“thinking through categories” modeled by Mullainathan, 2002). This was manifested in particular, in 
large-scale portfolio shifts from local assets (bonds, and also bank deposits) into foreign assets, and in a 
drastic fall in the demand for goods and services.    
13. Outside the corridor 
In the last three quarters of 2001, real GDP contracted by more than 10%. Investment collapsed. Lower 
realized incomes probably combined with fears of further declines to induce an abrupt fall in consumption 
(Graph 15). Smaller tax revenues, without hints of a recovery in sight, aggravated the fiscal difficulties, 
while the demand for public debt kept shrinking. Cut from access to “voluntary” credit, the government 
announced a policy of “zero deficit” (which meant in practice that payments would not be executed unless 
the flow of cash revenues made it possible) and pressured banks and pension funds to obtain loans. A 
large swap operation was organized, through which the government tried to extend the maturity of its 
debt. However, the very high yields of the newly issued bonds (in rough correspondence with the 
“country risk” spreads at the time) meant that repayment would be, and was expected to be, very 
problematic. 
The perception that a hard-pressed government was using the banks as financers of last resort, 
and that firms were experiencing a vertical decrease in sales discouraged the holding of deposits, and 
reinforced the demand for foreign exchange. The crowding out effect and the drop in deposits induced a 
sharp decline in credit to the private sector (Graph 8). Liquidity constraints visibly tightened throughout 
the economy. At the same time, the central bank was extending large volumes of rediscounts and 
provincial governments were trying to make ends meet by issuing quasi-monies; the monetary expansion 
was more than sterilized by the drop in reserves. Although the state of public opinion continued to 
suggest that devaluation was regarded with much fear, the spiral of falling activity, fiscal hardship and 
runs on deposits and foreign reserves made the end of the system of convertibility an imminent prospect.  
GRAPH 15 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AT  CONSTANT PRICES 








I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
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14.  Economic crash, institutional disruption 
In the last part of 2001 economic policies showed an intense activity. The ongoing crisis was the subject 
of much discussion, domestically and abroad. However, no concrete, practical scheme emerged in order 
to stop the spiral, or to organize a mechanism to reduce the costs of an exit from the convertibility system 
and a re-structuring of debts. Such a scheme would probably have implied a massive exercise of 
coordination between numerous groups of agents, in order to assign the losses resulting from the non-
fulfillment of promises of various kinds which had been made over time, and to agree on the policy 
regime that would be applied in the future. The demands of such an exercise would have exceeded the 
capacity for policy design, and the possibilities and incentives of political actors. The final months of 
convertibility were marked by an extreme political tension, which culminated in demonstrations that led 
to the resignation of the government. After a period of much turbulence, with several presidential changes 
in the space of a few days, the congress appointed a provisional president who remained in office until the 
elections held in 2003. 
15.  Contractual breakdown 
In December 2001, when the run was accelerating, the authorities established limits on cash withdrawals 
from banks, and restricted the sale of foreign exchange by the central bank. These measures represented a 
suspension of the convertibility of deposits into currency and of domestic money into dollars. But this did 
not appear to be a self-generated panic which a “cooling-off” period to re-coordinate expectations would 
interrupt. Depositors loudly expressed their dissatisfaction. In an economy where many transactions were 
carried out with cash (in the large informal sector, but also in formal retailing), those restrictions on the 
availability of funds implied strong constraints on trade; their unpopularity contributed to generate the 
climate that led to the downfall of the then president.  
In the midst of a great political and social turmoil, new authorities announced that the government 
would stop making payments on its debt, and established the termination of the convertibility system, 
with immediate devaluation. A jump in the exchange rate immediately posed as a problem the treatment 
of the large volume of dollar-denominated private debts, with the consequent tradeoffs between a policy 
intervention that would establish more or less uniform criteria and a hands-off approach that would leave 
the matter to arrangements between parties. In the event, the government decided not to legislate on 
obligations which did not involve financial intermediaries, while bank deposits and loans would be 
subject to “asymmetric pessification”. A measure much supported by business groups established the 
conversion of bank loans from dollars into pesos at a one-to-one rate (that is, without adjustment). Dollar 
deposits were transformed into pesos at a rate of 1.4 per dollar, and their maturities considerably 
extended; peso values would be adjusted with an index based on the CPI. The government would 
compensate the banks for the effect of the deposit-loan asymmetry through the issue of bonds. Regulated 
utility prices originally set in dollars were translated into pesos one-to-one, pending re-negotiation. 
Although in principle the conversion scheme increased the domestic purchasing power of 
deposits, public demonstrations and numerous legal demands manifested the strong reaction against 
pessification and the re-programming of maturities. Judicial decisions, which allowed individual 
depositors to recover their assets caused a considerable drain of funds from the banks in the following 
months. The fall in deposits continued even with strong restrictions on withdrawals. Those restrictions 
and the disappearance of credit tightened liquidity constraints faced by consumers and by many firms, at a 
moment when the prices of imported inputs had risen sharply. With extreme uncertainty about economic 
prospects and political turbulence, agents with available resources showed little willingness to spend in 
the country, and a strong preference for foreign assets. In 2002, in the midst of a very deep recession, the 
savings rate increased noticeably, and private capital outflows exceeded 10% of GDP (Graphs 4, 14), with 
CEPAL – Project Documents Collection  
 30
even higher values in the first part of the year. In that initial period alter the devaluation, the low levels of 
tax collection resulted in a sizable primary deficit for the public sector. Central bank credits to the 
government and to the banks fueled monetary expansion, while the issue of quasi-monies continued at a 
rapid pace.  
16.  Avoiding hyperinflation 
The exchange rate with the dollar multiplied by a factor of around four in the first half of 2002. However, 
there were no signs that in everyday transactions the population repudiated the national currency, which 
remained in general use (along with its provincial substitutes) as means of payment and denominator of 
prices. Together with the depression in demand, the perception by the public that the pre-devaluation 
values were still pertinent as a reference to evaluate current prices probably acted as deterrent against 
price increases. Behavior seemed more influenced by the recent experience of price stability than by the 
inflationary past. In a way, it was as if the collective behavior of agents invalidated their previous 
expectations of a monetary collapse if convertibility was abandoned, which had probably contributed to 
the spread of dollar contracting. 
In fact, the initial response of the CPI was quite slow. Although this outcome was clearly fragile 
(the monthly rate of price growth reached a peak 10% in April, Graph 16), it gave fiscal and monetary 
policies some time to react. The fear of hyperinflation, and its predictable political consequences, seemed 
to operate as a strong incentive on policy-making, even if the end of convertibility regime had removed 
both the nominal anchor and the set of constraints which had ruled monetary management for more than 
ten years, and no clearly defined alternative system had been established to replace it. 
GRAPH 16 
MONTHLY INFLATION RATES 1998-2005 











































































































































































 Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
Relative prices changed abruptly after the devaluation. As a result, the comparative purchasing 
powers of different activities were drastically altered. The share of exports, a coefficient with historically 
low values, jumped to more than 25% of GDP (Graph 17). At a time when other tax bases were at 
depressed levels, the imposition of export duties made a considerable contribution to revenues, while the 
lack of adjustment in government salaries and pensions contained spending. The primary balance of the 
public sector turned positive which, along with a deceleration of the fall in deposits, removed pressures on 
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monetary policies. Given the much higher exchange rate, the value of the domestic monetary aggregates 
had been reduced relative to that of central bank reserves. Consequently, interventions in the foreign 
exchange market could serve as strong instruments for monetary management. Thus, the fiscal and 
monetary difficulties were somewhat alleviated, which represented significant news when seen against 
the recent prospects of total collapse.  
GRAPH 17 
EXPORT COEFFICIENT AT CURRENT PRICES 













































Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
17.  Spending by liquid agents 
Aggregate spending and output, in real and in dollar terms, had dropped to very low levels, probably even 
lower than those that even a disturbed economy would sustain. While the economic and social climate 
encouraged capital flight, the low dollar prices of local goods and assets opened profitable opportunities 
for agents with liquid positions, exporters and holders of disposable dollar balances in particular. Behind 
the dramatic tone of everyday news, the large values of the trade surplus and of dollar hoards meant that 
there was a ready and sizable source of foreign exchange supply, and domestic demand, once the fears of 
an imminent debacle showed some hints of calming down.  
In the second half of 2002 the capital outflow did moderate, and various effects started to operate 
in opposite direction from that in the climax of the crisis. The currency appreciated, which dissipated 
inflationary expectations. The central bank now intervened to prevent a large fall in the price of the dollar, 
and purchased considerable amounts of foreign exchange (a policy that would continue in the next years). 
The money creation, increasingly the product of the accumulation of reserves, was matched by a rising 
demand. Restrictions to cash withdrawals from checking and savings accounts were removed without 
visible consequences. The issue of quasi-monies was stopped, as tax collection grew well in excess of 
government spending. Industrial output initiated a recovery, first through some substitution of imports, 
later mainly to supply a rising (from very low levels) domestic absorption. Firms had benefited from the 
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drastic pessification of their bank debts, and many had started to re-negotiate other obligations, including 
those with foreign creditors. Wages had lagged considerably behind industrial prices; the rise in unit 
margins facilitated self-financing. The level of activity could start to reverse its fall despite the almost 
complete absence of credit.    
18.  Residues of the crisis 
The crisis left visible marks, in social conditions and in the delayed repercussions of contractual 
breakdowns. The rate of unemployment reached highs of near 25%, while real wages fell sharply. The 
drastic decline in living standards of lower-income groups, only partially alleviated by emergency social 
programs, was reflected in a jump in the proportion of households below the poverty and extreme-poverty 
lines. At the same time, the real incomes of some sectors, producers of tradable goods, in particular, had 
experienced significant increases. The large re-valuation of the purchasing power of dollar assets caused a 
sizable wealth effect that mostly favored groups in the upper scales of the distribution, and those who had 
participated in the capital outflow. The conversion of bank deposits into pesos remained the subject of 
legal and political controversy. Public utility companies initiated demands to raise their prices and rates. 
The crisis had naturally increased the perception of the risks of investing in the country. The value of the 
public debt that was to be re-structured had grown significantly relative to GDP or to tax revenues 
(variables which had contracted sharply in dollar terms), and the future repayment capacity was subject to 
much uncertainty. 
In the complicated process of renegotiation of its debt (which finalized more than  three years 
after the declaration of default), the government stressed that it had no urgency to close a deal in order to 
access to new credits, and that it intended to make a sustainable offer under prudent macroeconomic 
assumptions. Eventually, three quarters of the creditors participated in a bond swap based on the 
projection of primary surpluses in the order of 3% of GDP along a path with moderate growth and a 
gradual real revaluation, and which implied a sizable debt reduction. The new bonds were issued together 
with ¨GDP units¨, which committed payments if the rates of real growth exceeded the hypothesis in the 
basic offer. Market valuations of the ¨GDP units¨ were initially quite low, but later increased significantly, 
suggesting that conjectures about the growth potential were being revised.  
19.  Another recovery: in search of a trend 
Despite the significant remaining uncertainties, the economy showed a rapid revival. By the end of 2005, 
real GDP had regained the levels of the previous peak (with an average increase of about 9% a year from 
the trough of the recession). The recovery had specific features. After a period of delay, exports 
responded to the higher real exchange rate and rising international prices. Even with a much expanded 
domestic demand, the trade surplus maintained sizable values (Graph 18). The positive current accounts 
were associated with aggregate savings rates at higher levels than in the previous decade (Graph 4), 
especially due to the contribution of the public sector. The investment rate rose considerably, from 
extremely low values. Although mortgage financing was practically non-existent, the demand for real 
estate and the construction activity recovered sharply (to levels above the previous peaks), probably 
through the mobilization of assets that the private sector had accumulated abroad. The relative prices of 
capital goods increased with the real exchange rate. Investment in machinery and equipment was initially 
well below the depreciation of capital. As the expansion of production and sales went on, the aggregate 
level of investment implied net additions to capacity (mainly through “incremental” projects), although 
the utilization of existing equipment continued to contribute to the high observed growth rate. The 
recovery was labor-intensive, so that the unemployment rate declined considerably, approaching levels in 
the order of 10%.  
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Source: ECLAC Buenos Aires Office, on the basis of official statistics. 
Despite the growth in spending, much higher tax revenues allowed the public sector to generate 
significant primary surpluses. The government insisted that generating such surpluses was among its main 
priorities, particularly in order to conserve autonomy in policy-making; in this regard, the authorities 
decided to pay off the debt with the IMF. Fiscal motives (given the importance of export taxes) combined 
with the objectives of keeping high levels of international reserves for precautionary reasons and 
supporting the profitability of traded-goods sectors to induce large interventions in the foreign exchange 
market, although without an announced exchange rate target. The real exchange rate declined gradually, 
mainly through the upwards drift in domestic prices. With a domestic demand which kept increasing 
rapidly, the inflation rate accelerated above 10% a year in 2005, to which the government responded by 
implementing incomes policies. Another source of tension was the tradeoff (recurrent in Argentine 
history) between foodstuff exports, which faced a strong external demand, and the domestic provision of 
staple wage good; in the event, the government decided to impose restrictions on exports.  
Those responses were consistent with the widespread critical attitudes towards the policies of the 
previous decade. Meanwhile, some of the learning effects of the crisis (both on the part of local and 
foreign agents) were reflected in the external and fiscal surpluses, and in the liquid positions of many 
sectors (including the government). A self-financed recovery appeared less vulnerable than past phases in 
which the rise in domestic demand used considerable amounts of foreign credit. The sharp recovery of 
real activity showed that the systemic disruption had had less permanent effects than might have been 
feared, and that the economy was “fundamentally” capable of sustaining levels of aggregate production 
and income well above those observed in the depth of the recession. However, there were still 
uncertainties about the system of policy rules and criteria that might guide longer-run decisions. The 
degree of persistence of the more favorable terms of trade depended on variable international 
circumstances. Planning horizons, much extended in the recovery, remained relatively short. 
Macroeconomic conditions had improved drastically after the crisis; the search for a sustained growth 
trend, and for a compatible path of spending, remained an open matter.  
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IV. Concluding remarks 
Macroeconomic crises are “memorable” events. For many individuals, they define a temporal landmark, 
in their conditions and their perceptions. Such episodes are often invoked for arguments and decisions 
well after their occurrence. Crises can hardly be considered “routine” phenomena which confirm previous 
expectations. They disturb plans and they motivate observable revisions of attitudes and beliefs. In some 
cases, the economic malfunction can endanger the social order (Leijonhufvud, 2003). The practical 
interest of the analysis of crises derives mainly from those disruptions, and from the demand for “lessons” 
that they generate. The search for lessons presupposes that there is something to learn in the exercise. The 
activity makes sense only if there is some relevant knowledge about the working of the system which was 
previously unavailable. It seems more or less natural to assume that economic agents, who often manifest 
having been surprised, and shocked, by the crisis, have also acted on knowledge which was incomplete.  
The “fundamental” estimation of long-run rates of return and repayment capacities relies on 
uncertain, and variable, conjectures and models of economic behavior. Fundamentals that determine the 
development of economies where structures and institutions are undergoing possibly irreversible changes 
are not readily identified, measured and projected. Near “bifurcations”, when crises erupt or precipitate, 
agents visibly watch the immediate behavior of others, either to try to extract information from the 
particular knowledge that those may have, or to find out whether runs or panics are in the making. 
However, the possibility of those effects that may induce “mass movements” seems to be conditioned by 
fundamental processes (Burnside et al., 2000). The typical background of panics seems to be one where 
previous beliefs held with some confidence are seriously in doubt, and where individuals are ready to 
make substantial changes in their views about the future. The shift to an “imitation mode” probably marks 
a situation where the procedures that agents used to form expectations by themselves are considered 
unreliable (Heymann et al, 2004). In any case, crises usually alter interpretations of the economy’s past, 
as well as anticipated prospects. Features of an economy which once may have been considered major 
assets for growth may come to be seen as problems or obstacles; policies or institutions which in the past 
served as trust-inspiring references may now be blamed for disappointments. 
The Argentine economy provides vivid examples of wide economic fluctuations and large swings 
in opinion. We have suggested that both phenomena were causally related, as changing views about the 
trend of the economy influenced current performance, and beliefs were conditioned by the observed 
evolution. The predisposition of agents to vary their perceptions was probably comparatively strong in an 
economy with a history of “variable trends” and where structural changes or policy shifts could motivate 
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the expectation of discontinuities in the growth path. On several occasions it appeared that evaluations of 
permanent incomes experienced sharp revisions as agents gathered or re-interpreted information. The 
credit market seemed to generate both deviation-reducing and deviation-amplifying effects of shocks, 
according to the shifts in the estimates of future incomes and repayment capacity of prospective debtors. 
A contrast between the behaviors in the initial phase of the recession that started in 1998, with a relatively 
slow decline, and those during the sharp fall in 2001 may indicate the presence of such effects. In the start 
of the post-devaluation recovery, a “pump-priming” impact of the spending by liquid agents can be 
identified as a mechanism that helped to reverse the depression. Interactions between economic 
performance and policy or institutional changes were frequently salient in the Argentine cycles. In some 
instances, these interactions probably reflected history-dependent behaviors, as in the reliance on a very 
tight monetary rule to stabilize in the early nineties and the absence of a return of very high inflation 
when that rule was broken in dramatic circumstances 
The varied experience of this economy highlights themes which have been prominent in the work 
of Axel Leijonhufvud. Whatever the specific validity of the arguments that we have suggested here, a 
glance at experiences like that of Argentina should identify, in one way or another, the problems of 
intertemporal coordination, the counterpoint between small and large disturbances, the relevance of the 
sequential decision-making of agents and the interrelated dynamics of policy institutions and economic 
performance. The contributions of Leijonhufvud will continue to help understanding the behavior of 
concrete economies.  
CEPAL – Project Documents Collection  
37 
References 
Aguiar, M. and G. Gopinath (2004a): “Emerging Markets Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend”, 
NBER Working Paper 10734. 
___________ (2004b): “Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston Working Paper 04-5. 
Arellano, C. and E. Mendoza (2002): “Credit Frictions and ‘Sudden Stops’ in Small Open Economies: An 
Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging Market Crises”, NBER Working Paper 
8880. 
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (2000): “On the Fundamentals of Self-Fulfilling Speculative 
Attacks”, Rochester Center for Economic Research Working Paper 468. 
Calvo, G. (1998): “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden  Stops”, 
Journal of Applied Economics, 1, 1. 
Calvo, G. and C. Reinhart (2000): “The Fear of Floating”, NBER Working Paper 7993. 
Cespedes, L., R. Chang and A. Velasco (2000): “Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate Policy”, NBER 
Working Paper 7840. 
Chang, R. and A. Velasco (2001): “A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 116 (May). 
Chari, V. and P. Kehoe (2003): “Hot Money”, Journal of Political Economy, 111, 6, December. 
Clark, A. (1998): Being There, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Damill, M. and R. Frenkel (2003): “Argentina: Macroeconomic Performance and Crisis”, in R. Ffrench- 
Davis, D. Nayyar and J. Stiglitz, eds.: Stabilization Policies for Growth and Development,New 
York, Initiative for Policy Dialogue. 
Damill, M., R. Frenkel and R. Maurizio (2003): “Políticas Macroeconómicas y Vulnerabilidad  Social: 
la Argentina de los Años Noventa”, Desarrollo Económico, 170. 
De la Torre, A., E. Levy Yeyati and S. Schmuckler (2002): “Argentina’s Financial Crisis: Floating 
Money, Sinking Banking”, World Bank Working Paper. 
CEPAL – Project Documents Collection  
 38
Fanelli, J. (2006): “International Financial Architecture, Macro Volatility and Institutions. An Overview”, 
CEDES Working Paper. 
Galiani, S., D. Heymann and M. Tommasi: “Great Expectations and Hard Times: the Argentine 
Convertibility Plan”, Economia (LACEA), Spring. 
Ghosal, S. and M. Miller (2005): “Bargaining with Delay: Growth and Sustainability”, University of 
Warwick Working Paper. 
Haussmann, R. and A. Velasco (2002): “Hard Money’s Soft Underbelly: Understanding the Argentine 
Crisis”, Kennedy School of Government Working Paper. 
Haussmann, R. and F. Sturzenegger (2005): “U.S. and Global Imbalances: Can Dark Matter  Prevent a 
Big Bang?” Kennedy School of Government, mimeo. 
Heymann, D. (1994): “Sobre la Interpretación de la Cuenta Corriente”, Economia Mexicana, 1. 
___________ (2006): “Buscando la Tendencia: Crisis Macroeconómica y Recuperación en la Argentina”, 
CEPAL Buenos Aires, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas, No. 31. 
Heymann, D., M. Kaufman and P. Sanguinetti (2001): “Learning About Trends: Spending and Credit 
Fluctuations in Open Economies, in A. Leijonhufvud, ed.: Monetary Theory as a  Basisfor 
Monetary Policy, Palgrave. 
Heymann, D. and E. Kawamura (2005): “On Liability Dollarization: a Simple Model”, CEPAL Buenos 
Aires Working Paper. 
Heymann, D., R. Perazzo and A. Schuschny (2004): “Learning and Imitation in Variants of the BAM”, 
Advances in Complex Systems, March. 
Heymann, D, and B. Kosacoff, eds. (2000): Desempeño Económico en un Contexto de Reformas:  la 
Argentina de los Noventa, Buenos Aires, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires. 
Heymann, D. and A. Leijonhufvud (1995): High Inflation, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Howitt, P. (2006): “The Microfoundations of the Keynesian Multiplier Process”, Journal of Economic 
Interaction and Coordination, 1. 
Ize, A. and E. Levy Yeyati (2003): “Financial Dollarization”, Journal of International Economics, 59. 
Jeanne, O. (2003): “Why do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency”, IMF Working Paper. 
Kaminsky, G. (1999): “Currency and Banking Crises: the Early Warnings of Distress”, Working Paper. 
___________ (2003): “Varieties of Currency Crises”, NBER Working Paper 10193. 
Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart (1999): “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of 
Payments Problems”, American Economic Review, 89. 
Kosacoff, B. and A. Ramos (1999): La Estructura Argentina Contemporánea, 1975-2000, Buenos Aires, 
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1973): “Effective Demand Failures: Swedish Economic Papers. 
___________ (1981): “The Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme”, in A. Leijonhufvud: 
Information and Coordination, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
___________ (1998a): “Mr. Keynes and the Moderns”, European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought. 
___________ (1998b): “Two Types of Crises”, Zagreb Journal of Economics, 2, December. 
CEPAL – Project Documents Collection  
39 
___________ (2003): “Macroeconomic Crises and the Social Order”, Invited Lecture, Universidad 
Nacional de la Plata. 
___________ (2006): “The Uses of the Past”, Invited Lecture, The European Society for the  History of 
Economic Thought. 
Mendoza, E. (2006): “Lessons from the Debt-Deflation Theory of Sudden Stops”, NBER  Working Paper 
11966. 
Mullainathan, S. (2002): “Thinking Through Categories”, Working Paper. 
Mussa, M. (2002): “Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy”, Institute of International 
Economics Working Paper. 
Perry, G. and M. Servén (2002): “The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why was Argentina Special  and 
What Can We Learn From It”, World Bank Working Paper 
Powell, A. (2002): “The Argentine Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Economics, Bad Advice”, Universidad 
Torcuato Di Tella Working Paper. 
Sargent. T. (2001): “The Conquest of American Inflation”, Princeton University Press. 
Sachs, J., A. Tornell and A. Velasco (1996): “The Mexican Peso Crisis: Sudden Death or Death 
Foretold?”, Journal of International Economics, 41. 
Stallings, B. and W. Peres (2000): Crecimiento, Empleo y Equidad; El Impacto de las Reformas 
Económicas en América Latina”, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
Vaz, D. (1999): “Four Banking Crises: Their Causes and Consequences”, Revista de Economía. 
